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The Problem 
The phenomenon we discuss is illustrated by the contrast in ( 1 )·( 8) (we use 
coindexing to indicate intuitive binding): 
(1) ??Every dog; came in. It; lay down under the table. 
(2) *If every cat; purrs, it, is happy. 
(3) *If John owes every man; money then Sam pays him;. [Hornstein, 
1984] 
(4) *John likes every dog; and Sam feeds it;. [Hornstein, 1984] 
(5) Every story; pleases these children. If it; is about animals, they are 
excited, if it; is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it, is about 
humans, they never want me to stop. [Belvadi, 1989] 
(6) Each degree candidate; walked to the stage. He, took his diploma from 
the dean and returned to his, seat. (Partee, from [Roberts, 1987]) 
(7) Each student, in the syntax class was accused of cheating on the exam 
and he; wa.s reprimanded by the dean. [Fodor and Sag, 1982] 
(8) Each candidate; for the space mission meets all our requirements. He; 
has a Ph.D. in Astrophysics and extensive prior flight experience. 
[Roberts, 1987] 
Data of the type in (1)-(4) led Heim ([Heim, 1982], p.204) to assume the 
Scope Constraint: quantifiers cannot take scope beyond the clause in which 
they appear at S-structure. Yet, (5)-(8) involve an occurrence of a singular 
pronoun which is in some sense anaphorically related to a universal quantifier 
in the previous sentence. Roberts [1987] called this phenomenon telescoping. 
DRT, DMG, and Telescoping 
In the Kamp/Heim approach, (i) quantifiers are unable to bind variables 
outside their scope at S-structure, (ii) indefinite NP's have no quantificational 
power of their own, and (iii) provisions for default existential quantification of 
free variables account for the ability of indefinites to be anaphorically related 
to pronouns outside their scope. In this approach, the intuitive bindings in 
2 
3 
348 
(1)-(4) are correctly ruled out by (i). The data in (5)-(8), on the other hand, 
arc unaccounted for. 
In Groencndjik and Stokhof's Dynamic Montague Grammar (DMG), in-
definites are existentia.l quantifiers. Their ability to enter in anaphoric rela-
tions with pronouns outside their scope is accounted for by assuming that 
existential quantifiers are able to bind variables outside their scope. This 
means that (i) is false in DMG. Thus, (.5)-(8) are naturally analyzed in DMG 
as instances of variable binding. For example, using the dynamic version of 
the universal quantifier, (9) would be translated as (10), which is equivalent 
to (11). 
(9) 	 Each degree; candidate walked to the stage. Ile; took his; diploma from 
the dean. 
( 10) Ad;[degree-candidate( d;) =;, walked-to-the-stage(di)]; 
took-his-diploma-from-the-dean(d;) 
(11) 	 Ad;[degree-candidate( d,) =;, [walked-to-the-stage(d; ); 
took-his-diploma-from-the-dean( d; )]] 
Int.his analysis, however, (1)-(4) are problematic, since we might expect the 
universal quantifier t.o he able to bind t.he pronoun. 
Towards an Account of Telescoping 
What. we want t.o do at. this point. is to present. t.he !llain features of t.he 
account of telescoping we have in mind, so that you know where we are 
heading. Then, we'll pursue various aspects of the account in more detail. 
Roberts [1989] suggested a11 analysis of the data in (5)-(8) which is com-
patible with the scope constraint.. In this analysis, for example, (6) under-
goes an accommodation process whose out.corn(' is t.hat. t.hc second sentence 
in (6) is rC'presC'nkd as a tripartit(' structure whose restrictor has bC'C'n rc-
const.ruct.nl as in (12'): 
(12) 	 Ile; t.ook his diploma frorn t.ll<' dean and returned t.o his; SC'at. 
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However, neither Roberts nor Gnwnendjik and St.okhof address in a syskm-
at.ic way why the contrast. in (1)-(8) arises. We will argue t.hat the analysis of 
t('lescoping in terms of Rob('rts' l"('Strictor r('construction approach is prefer-
able to the variable binding approach. We suggest that reconstruction of the 
restrictor is subject to the following necessary licensing condit.ion: 
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Licensing Condition for Restrictor Reconstruction 
Given a sentence S, reconstruction of a restrictor for S is possible 
only if the discourse makes it clear that S is to be interpreted 
relative to a restrictor. 
The task we face in suggesting this condition is obviously that of explaining 
what "make clear" means. We suggest that there are two basic ways in 
which the discourse can make it clear that S is to be interpreted relative to 
a restrictor. One way, which Roberts also pointed out, is given in A: 
A. 	 The discourse can make it clear that a sentence S is to be interpreted 
relative to a restrictor by explicitly indicating via syntactic means the 
presence of an operator which takes a restrictor and a nuclear scope. 
For example, the presence of an if-then structure is an explicit indication of 
the presence of a restrictor. Thus, (5) is an instance of A: 
(5) 	 Every story. pleases these children. If it; is about animals, they are 
excited, if it; is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it; is about 
humans, they never want me to stop. (Belvadi) 
Assuming that the generic operator is an operator on tripartite structures 
(see, e.g., [Heim, 1982; Carlson, 1987; Krifka, 1992]) instances of telescoping 
with generic sentences like (13) also fall under A. The constrast in (14), 
pointed out to us by Geoff Nunberg, shows again how the possibility of 
a generic reading, licensed by the bare NP "ostracism" in (14a), licenses 
telescoping. 
(13) 	 Every Italiani loves his, mother. He; adores her. 
(14) 	 a. Every male Athenian citizen; voted on ostracism. He wrote the 
name of the candidate on a piece of pottery. 
b. 	 Every male Athenian citizen; voted on the ostracism. ??He wrote 
the name of the candidate on a piece of pottery. 
(15) is also an instance of A: 
(15) 	 No story; pleases these children. If it; is about animals they yawn, if 
it, is about witches they frown. If it, is about people they fall asleep. 
Assuming that downward monotonic quantifiers like 'no' can be represented 
in DRT as in (16), the accommodation of the missing antecedent would yield 
representation (15'), which assigns correct truth-conditions to (15): 
(l6) 	 ,P~x)I - ~ IQ(x)I 
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(15') 
y 
CHlLDREN(y) 
X 2 
STORY(x) 
X Z 
ABOUT·AN!MALs(z) 
PLEA~f;])(X, y) 
The other way in which the discourse can make it ckar tlrnt S is to be 
interpreted relative to a restridor is B: 
B. 	 The discourse can make it clear that a sentence S is to be interpreted 
relative to a restrictor by providing contextual information which links 
S to a restrictor. 
In order to illustrate the meaning of H, let's observe that by making it clear 
that the events dcscril,ed an~ part of a script in which every member of a 
contextually-giv<'fl group insta.ntiates il ccrtaiH property. telescoping becomes 
possible even when at first sight it was not. Consider ( 1) again: 
(1) ??Every dog; came in. It; lay down under the tab!P. 
Now, read (1) in the context provided by (17): 
(17) 	 I went to the circus last night. They had a number involving dogs that 
went like this: The circus perfornwrs p11!. a table 011 some supports. 
Then, every dog came iu. It lay down under the table, stood on its 
back paws, and lifted the table with its front paws. 
In this context, (1) becomes marginally acceptable. In cases such as the 
sequence of <'Vents described by (6), the script may be already known to 
the reader: it is common knowledge that in graduation ceremonies a certain 
routine b performed by all ckgrcc caBdidates. \Ve ,uggest that it is this 
context11ally-givcn knowledge tliat makes it possible to recover a rest.rictor 
for the telescoped sentence: 
A context c may link S to a restrictor [a] only if [a] =;, Sis a step 
of a script salient in c. 
Notice that looking at telescoping as restrict.or reconstruction leads one to 
expect that telescoping of a pronoun in a simple sentence should be subject 
to a constraint of the type above. lf the presence of a rrstrictor for S is not 
explicitly indicated by the syntax, the tripartite structure itself needs to be 
reconstructed together with an appropriate content for the restrictor. And 
it seems plausible to assume that structure-building operations of this sort 
at the discourse level are allowed only when the context gives a \'ery clear 
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indication that the simple sentence is to be interpreted relative to a restrictor. 
On the other hand, the variable binding approach yields no account of why 
telescoping of a pronoun in a simple sentence should be constrained as it is, 
since, in this approach, whether the pronoun occurs in a tripartite structure 
or not makes no difference to the ability of the universal quantifier in the 
previous sentence to bind the pronoun. 
This concludes the intuitive sketch of the proposal. Now, we turn to 
pursuing it in more detail. First, we discuss the instances of telescoping in 
which the presence of a restrictor is syntactically signalled, and then those 
instances of telescoping that involve reconstructing the structure. 
Reconstructing the Content of the Restrictor 
The Nature of the Reconstruction Process 
There are different ways in which one might think of the process of recon-
structing the content of the restrictor in telescoping examples like (5): 
(5) 	 Every story, pleased the children. If it, was about animals, they were 
excited, if it; was about witches, they were enchanted, and if it; was 
about humans, they never wanted me to stop. 
One way is to look at it as a purely pragmatic process in which contextu-
ally salient material is inserted into the restrictor. In this purely pragmatic 
approach, 
(i) 	 considerations of plausibility and consistency may determine what gets 
filled in the restrictor; 
(ii) 	 what material gets accommodated in the restrictor is not constrained by 
the semantic structure of the preceding discourse, unless this structure 
can be maintained to affect the saliency of the descriptive material 
considered for accommodation; 
(iii) 	 no formal relation is assumed between the telescoped pronoun and the 
NP to which the pronoun is intuitively related. 
But views of the reconstruction process which do not assume (i)-(iii) are also 
possible. For example, one could reject (iii) and maintain that 
(iv) 	 the pronoun and its intuitive antecedent are formally related, but this 
formal relation is not semantically realized as variable binding. 
(One needs to add the "but" if (iv) is not to be collapsed with the variable 
binding view.) Or one might reject (ii) and claim that 
(v) 	 the semantic structure of the preceding discourse plays a role beyond 
affecting saliency in constraining accommodation. 
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Mixed views are also possible. One could maintain (iv) or ( v) and make room 
for (i) as well. Which view is correct? 
In the examples of telescoping considered so far, in which the tripartite 
structure is explicitly indicated, the accommodated material seems to come 
from the universally quantified NP which we intuitively perceive as the an-
tecedent of the pronoun (AR intuitively accommodated restrictor): 
(5) 	 Every story, pleases these children. If it; is about animals, they are 
excited, if it, is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it; is about 
humans, they never want me to stop. 
AR: [x is a story) 
(13) 	 Every Italian, loves his; mother. He, adores her. 
AR: [x is an Italian) 
(15) 	 No story; pleases these children. If it; is about animals they yawn, if 
it; is about witches they frown. If it; is about people they fall asleep. 
AR: [x is a story] 
But this is no evidence that telescoping requires us to assume that there 
is a formal relation of some sort between the telescoped pronoun and the 
universally quantified NP. For example, the fact that only material from the 
NP is borrowed in (15) may follow from the fact that the first sentence in 
the discourse has already made clear that the set of stories that please these 
children is empty. Thus, if we accommodated the antecedent "x is a story 
that pleases these children" in the second sentence, the conditional would 
become trivial. For (5), on the other hand, accommodating material from 
the NP and from the VP rather than from the NP alone would not result 
in different truth-conditions for the discourse as a whole, since by the time 
the second sentence is processed, the common ground already contains the 
information that the set of stories is identical to the set of stories that please 
these children. A purely pragmatic version of the antecedent reconstruction 
process, therefore, seems to work fine for the examples of telescoping we have 
considered so far. Considerations of plausibility dictate what gets filled in 
the antecedent. Consider, however, examples (18)-(20): 
(18) 	 Not every paper; is written in Italian. If it, is submitted to an English 
journal, the editors don't like it;. 
(19) 	 Not every paper; that gets submitted to a journal is a good paper. If 
it, is accepted, it;'s a good paper. 
(20) 	 Not every paper; assumes dialectical materialism. If it, is read at an 
international conference, the audience doesn't like it,. 
Consider sentence ( 19). In this case, the understood interpretation for the 
pronoun is "x is a paper submitted to a journal" rather than "x is a paper 
submitted to a journal which is a good paper." The pragmatic account 
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of telescoping makes the correct prediction in this case, since the second 
sentence would become trivial if we copied "x is a paper submitted to a 
journal which is good paper" into the antecedent box of the second sentence. 
Consider (18), however. Here, plausibility suggests the antecedent of the 
telescoped sentence should be filled with "x is a paper written in Italian," 
since if we copy "x is a paper," we would get a very implausible reading, 
namely the reading that "if a paper is submitted to an English journal, the 
editors don't like it." Thus, the pragmatic story predicts that we should 
understand (18) as saying what (21) says. In fact, (18) cannot get reading 
(21). English speakers find (18) bad since the only reading available, given 
in (22), doesn't make much sense. 
(21) 	 Not every paper is written in Italian. If xis a paper written in Italian 
and x is submitted to an English journal, the editors don't like it. 
(22) 	 Not every paper is written in ItaJian. If xis a paper and xis submitted 
to an English journal, the editors don't like it. 
Example (20) makes the same point as (18). Notice, moreover, that the in-
ability of the reconstruction process to collect material from the VP cannot be 
attributed to the fact that material in the VP is inaccessible for telescoping, 
since (23) is an acceptable instance of telescoping: 
(23) 	 These children like every storyi. If it; is about animals, they are excited, 
if iti is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it; is about humans, 
they never want me to stop. 
What the data in (18)-(23) point at is that a purely pragmatic account of 
accommodation won't do for telescoping. But what is the full moral we 
should draw from (18)-(23)'? 
A Constraint on Accomodation 
\Ve suggest Cl as a constraint on accommodation: 
Cl If a discourse marker x is accommodated in a restrictor r, only descrip-
tive material in the minimal box whose universe contains x can be ac-
commodated in r. 
We also assume that accommodation follows Pl: 
Pl Accommodate descriptive material from the minimal box containing the 
accommodated discourse marker up to inconsistency or implausibility 
Let us now return to the instances of telescoping in (5), (13), (15), (18)-(20). 
The constraints we proposed yield the correct choice of restrictors for these 
cases. Take (5), for example: the discourse referent accommodated in the 
corresponding DRS (5') is x, and the only descriptive material in the box 
whose universe contains xis STORY(x), which is the intuitively correct choice 
of restrictor (AR= intuitively accommodated restrictor): 
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(,5) 	 Every story; pleases these children. If it, is about animals, they are 
excited, if it, is about witches, they are enchanted, and if it, is about 
humans, they never want me to stop. (AR: [x is a story]) 
y 
CHILDREN(y) 
X 
STORY(x)( 5') 
X Z 
STORY( 2:) 
£XCITED(y) 
ABOUT-ANIMALS(z) 
x=z 
Similarly, in the DRS for ( 13) only the condition ITALIA~(x) can be accommo-
dated for :r. The descriptive material accommodated for y is MOTHER(x, y). 
We don't need to accommodate LOVJ::S(x,y) since the first sentence in the 
discourse has already told us that every Italian loves his mother. 
(13) 	 Every Italian, loves his, mother. He; adores her. (AR: [xis an Italian]) 
( 13') 
y 
I11:LIAN(x) I G MOTHER(I, y)-
LOVES(x, y) 
X y 
ITALIAN(,) G. IADORES(y) I 
MOTHER(x, y) 
The DRS for the first sentence in ( 18) is (24 ): 
(18) 	 Not every paper; is written in Italian. If it; is submitted to an English 
journal, the editors don't like it;. (AR: [xis a paper]) 
(24) 	 --, X 
PAPl.:R(t·) 
Thus, given Cl, only "x is a paper" could be accommodated. However, this 
would result in an implausible reading of ( 18). A similar prediction is made 
for (19). The first sentence in (19) gets represented as (25): 
(19) 	 Not every paper; that gets submitted to a journal is a good paper. If 
it; is accepted, it;'s a good paper. (AR: [xis a paper]) 
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X y 
(2,5) ~  PAPER(x)  
JOURNAL(y)  
SllllMITTEO(x,y) 
Given the constraints above, the whole descriptive material of the antecedent 
DRS is accommodated in the restrictor of the second sentence. Finally, in 
the case of (15), the choice of the structure !(1 '*"' !(2 for the first sentence 
in (1.5) yields representation (15') in which the accommodated material is 
STOllY{x), since this is the only material in the minimal box containing x. 
(15) 	 No story; pleases these children. If it1 is about animals they yawn, if 
it; is about witches they frown. If it, is about people they fall asleep. 
AR: [x is a story] 
( 15') 
y 
CHILOREN(y) 
S;ORY(x)I - ~ lrLEASEO(x, y) I 
X z 
STORY(x) 
- IYAWNM]X = Z 
ABOUT-ANIMALS( Z) 
... 
Moreover, choosing a representation of the form "'I{ for the first sentence in 
(15), as in (26), 
y 
CHILOREN(y) 
(26) X 
-, STORY(x) 
PLEASES(x, y) 
would still result in the same choic<~ of STORY{ x) as the accommodated 
rcstrictor, because accommodating PLEASES(x, y) in addition to STORY(x) 
would make the conditional structure for the second sentence trivial, since 
the discourse has already informed us that thPre is no story that pleases these 
children. (Accommodating only PLEASES(x,y) would make the conditional 
implausible since the property predicated of the "it" indicates that "it" refers 
to "stories.") 
The constraints above also predict the correct choice of a rcstrictor for 
Roberts' example of modal subordination in (13): 
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(1:i) A; wolf might come in. It; would eat you first. 
AR: x is a wolf that comes in  
In this cac~e, the DRS for the first sentence in (13) is (27):  
X 
(27 ) 0 WOLF(x) 
COMES-lN(xJ 
Thus, all of the descriptive material of the DRS under the scope of the di-
amond would l.w carried along. Finally, the constraints abov<' predict the 
correct choice of a restrictor for tllf' second sentence in (28) (pointed out to 
us by Makoto Kanazawa): 
(28) 	 No man; can be friends with a woman1 he, finds attractive. He; always 
wants to have sex with her;. (from "When Harry met Sally") 
In (28) the understood antecedent for the second sentence is (29) and not 
(30): 
(29) if x is a man and y is ii woman x finds attractive 
(30) if xis a man and y is a woman x finds attractive and y is a woman x 
is friends with 
In this case, what prPvents the choice of antecedent (30) is that the discourse 
prior to the utterance of the second sentence in (28) has made it clear that 
there are no men tha.t can be friends with a woman they find attractive 
and thus the choice of the antecedent in (29) would result in trivializing the 
conditional. 
According to our proposal then. at least (i) and (Y) are needed in order 
to account for how the accommodation process works: 
(i) 	 considerations of plausibility and consistency may determine what gets 
fill,·d in the restridor; 
( v) 	 the semantic structure of the preceding discourse plays a role in con-
straining accommodation beyond affecting saliency. 
We are not suggesting that Cl and Pl are the only constraints on accom-
modation. But, in view of the cases we have considered, it seems to us 
that a purely pragmatic approach is unlikely to yield the correct range of 
interpretations. At least sonwthing like Cl and Pl arc needed. 
The Variable Binding Approach 
At this point, you may want to come back to th<:' bound variable approach 
and see whether it does any better than the accommodation approach. Let's 
consid<:'r Roberts's modal subordination first.. 
5 
357 
Roberts [1987; 1989] noticed that discourses of tht> type in (31 a) are prob-
lematic for DltT, since the reference marker introduced by the indefinite is 
not accessible to the pronoun ''it" ( under the interpretation consistent with 
there bcil!g no wolf around). Rol>crts argu<'d that (31a) cannot be plausibly 
treated by assuming that the second sentence in (31a) is brought under the 
srnpe of the possil,ility operator as in (3 I b ), since this would a.ssign incorrect. 
truth-conditions to (31a), i.e. it would predict that (31a) is synonymous with 
(31 c). 
(31) a. A, wolf might come in. It, would eat you first. 
WOLF(x)
b, ,,) 
C'OME-I;<;(x) 
EAT-YOU-FIRST(x) 
c. A, wolf might curnc in and c,1t you first. 
One might object that this is not a conclusive argument against treating 
(31,t) as a case of irn;ertiuu (and thus of variable binding) as in (3Ib) since 
in (31b) we have simply ignored the modal "would". One might argue that 
if we don 'l igw.>n' the "would", it is possible to assume that the pronoun 
is a bound variable and obtair; correct truth-conditions. In DRT this would 
amount to assuming DRS (32) in place of ('.ilb): 
X 
WOLF(.r) 
(32) 0 C0'.,1E-IN(x) 
~------~ 
oj EAT-YOU-FIRST(x) I 
Groenendijk and Stokhof [1!!90] could generate an equivalent formula by as-
suming that the possibility operator can extend its scope over the second 
sentence in (3la). In fact, we think there is some evidence in suppmt of 
Roberts's contention that (31a) is not an instance of variable binding. Con-
sider (33) 
(33) a. A marmot may be inside. It would bite your hand. 
b. It IHil,Y be the case tliat a marmot is inside and would bite your 
hand. 
Contrast (33) shows tl1at the interpretation of the sentence in which the 
··would" is under the scope of a possibility operator differs from the interpre-
tation of the corresponding sentence in which the ~would" is not. IntuitivPly, 
under the epistemic reading of the possibility operator, the necessity operator 
requires an epistemic reading in (33b), but not in (33a). The differen,f" may 
be seen clearly in (34), where it is explicitly indicated that the possibility 
operator should be understood epistemically: 
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(34) a. In view of what I believe, a marmot may be inside. It would bite 
your hand. 
b. In view of what I believe, it may be the case that a marmot is 
inside and would bite your hand. 
Thus, the revised version of the insertion approach still fails to get the truth-
conditions right. This suggests that Roberts's missing antecedent approach 
is preferable: in this approach, the modal base of "would" may be fixed 
independently of the modal base of the possibility operator, since "would" 
is not in the scope of the possibility operator. Another way of putting the 
problem for the insertion approach is that although (35) is a theorem of S5, 
{35) <)Dq--> Dq 
once we allow for different modal bases for "would" and "might," we are no 
longer in a position to derive "A wolf that came in would eat you first" from 
DRS in (32). 
Now, let's return to the example of telescoping involving "no": 
{15) No story, pleases these children. If it; is about animals they yawn, if 
it; is about witches they frown. If iti is about people they fall asleep. 
Recall that Dynamic Quantifiers are capable of binding variables outside 
their scope and that dynamic operators do not freeze dynamic effects of 
formulae in their scope. To avoid predicting that the negation hidden in the 
meaning of the subject NP "no story" takes scope over the second sentence 
in (15), Groenendijk and Stokhof suggest that the choice of a translation for  
quantifiers is constrained by the following monotonicity constraint:  
MC 1 [<P; IV] l=l <I>  
The constraint requires that "for any proper translation of a sentence <I> at  
the discourse level, it should hold that the truth-conditional content of <I>  
continued with IV is at least as strong as <I> itself." The intuitive motivation  
for the constraint is that in this way we require that  
MC (English) no step in a discourse can constitute a weakening of the truth  
conditional content of the discourse up to that point 
Intuitively, MC prevents negation in (15) from taking scope over the second 
sentence since this would result in the discourse being weaker than the first 
sentence. The monotonicity constraint proposed by Groenendijk and Stokhof 
is effective in requiring a choice of translation of the type in (36) for 'no' in 
(15): 
(36) AP,,\QAdi["P(di) =}j!-"Q(di)l 
In this case, negation is prevented from taking scope over the second sentence 
in the discourse by the down arrow ( assuming "' is dynamic negation, i!"' 
is its static counterpart.) The result is that discourse ( 15) is assigned a 
translation of the form in (37): 
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(37) Ad;[P '*il-"QJ; R 
The dynamic universal is able to bind the pronoun in the second sentence 
of the discourse, without generating incorrect truth-conditions. Consider 
however, example (28) again: 
(28) 	 No man, can be friends with a womanj he, finds attractive. He, always 
wants to have sex with herj. 
The indefinite "a woman he finds attractive" is translated as an existential 
by Groenendijk and Stokhof. If we adopt a translation of the type in (37), 
however, negation closes the existentially quantified formula and prevents "a 
woman" from anaphorically binding the pronoun "her" in the second sentence 
of the discourse. On the other hand, if we do not close negation off and we 
also assume that implication is dynamic in order to allow the existential "a 
woman" to bind the pronoun "her," then we predict incorrectly that (28) 
should have reading (38): 
(38) 	 if x is a man then it's not the case that (there is a y such that y is a 
woman that x finds attractive and y can be friends with x and x always 
wants to have sex with y.) 
Thus, while the accommodation approach runs into the problem of explain-
ing why accommodation happens in the way it does, the variable binding 
approach runs into an even more radical problem: it's hard to see how the 
correct truth-conditions for the telescoping cases and for the modal subordi-
nation cases could be derived in Groenendjik and Stokhof's DMG. 1 Finally, 
as we observed before, the variable binding approach yields no account of 
why telescoping of a pronoun in a simple sentence S should be limited to 
cases in which contextual information linking S to a restrictor is present. 
We will now consider the cases of telescoping in sentences without explicit 
tripartite structures. 
Telescoping Without Explicit Tripartite Structures 
Scripts and Telescoping 
Consider again the contrast between (6) (repeated a.,; (39a)) and (l) (repeated 
as (39b)). The most obvious difference between the two sentences is that two 
different determiners are used- "every" is used in (39a), whereas "each" is 
used in (39b ). But (39c) is not significantly better than (39b). We have seen, 
on the other hand, that when (39b) is read in the context provided by (40), 
( 39b) becomes marginally acceptable. 
revision of DMG assigns correct truth conditions to (28) by raising 
once more the type of the translation of sentences and redefining dynamic negation. An 
evaluation of Dekker's system requires more space than we have available. 
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(39) 	 a. Each degree candidate; walked to the stage. He; took his diploma 
from the dean and returned to his; seat. 
b. 	 ??Every dog, came in. It, lay down under the table. 
c. 	 ??Each dog; came in. It; lay down under the table. 
(40) 	 I went to the circus last night. They had a number involving dogs that 
went like this: The circus performers put a table on some supports. 
Then, every dog came in. It lay down under the table, stood on its 
back paws, and lifted the table with its front paws. 
As said in section 3, ( 40) seems to support the hypothesis that telescoping 
becomes possible if the context makes it clear that what is being described 
is a routine performed by all the elements of the set quantified over. Until 
the routine is terminated, every sentence describing an event which is clearly 
part of the routine can contain a pronoun whose antecedent is the universally 
quantified NP. In cases like (39a), the routine may be already known to the 
reader: it is common knowledge that in graduation ceremonies a certain 
routine is required of all the participants. 
Further support for this hypothesis comes from the fact that the more 
explicit the speaker is in signaling that a routine is being described, the easier 
telescoping becomes: 
(41) 	 Here is the procedure for the thesis defense. Every professor in the 
committee receives a copy of the thesis a month in advance. She writes 
down her comments and sends it back .... 
The simplest way to formalize this hypothesis, we believe, is to adopt the 
framework proposed in [Kamp, 1983; Kamp, 1990], in which the universal 
DRS is partitioned into a number of articulated DRS's. We will also as-
sume, following [Kamp, 1983], that one of these articulated DRS's is used to 
represent those items which are in 'implicit focus'~ i.e., those items which 
constitute 'background information' made salient by the discourse. For ex-
ample, the discourse in (39a) causes a structure of the type in ( 42) to be 
added to the articulated DRS which contains the items in implicit focus, 
much in the same way that task structures are put in implicit focus in the 
dialogues observed by Grosz [1977]: 
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y 
STAGE(y) 
DEAN(z) 
I 
(42) DEGREE-CAN DIDATE(x) 
X 
DEG REE-CAN DI DATE(x) 
X 
DEGREE-CANDIDATE( X) 
SHOOK-HAN DS-WITH(x, z) 
ILEAVE(x)I 
Let's call a DRS like ( 42) a script. (The steps of the script should be ordered, 
of course, but we want to keep the representation as simple as possible.) Let's 
also say that a script is active when it has been copied into the articulated 
DRS which represents the implicit focus. A sentence instantiates a step of a 
script if the predicate of its matrix clause is identical with the predicate of 
!,he consequent of the step. The rule invoked to reconstruct the logical form 
of the second sentence of (6) may then be informally described as follows: 
Step Reconstruction: If the script K is currently active, and if the 
rnrrent sentence S instantiates a step K' of the script following 
the last one which has been instantiated, then 
L 	add to the root DRS the tripartite DRS K11 whose restrictor 
is identical to the restrictor of K', and 
2. 	 add ( the S-structure of) S to the nuclear scope of K11 
The interpretation for (6) that we derive from this (much simplified!) rule is 
shown in (61 ). The tripartite DRS associated with the anaphoric sentence has 
universal force. Its restrictor has been reconstructed in the manner described 
above, and its nuclear scope consists of the clause "He shook hands with the 
tlean and left." The truth-conditions of (61) can be paraphrased as "Each 
student walked to the stage. Each student shook hands with the dean and 
left." 
{6') 
y z 
STAG E(y) 
DEAN(z) 
X 
IDEGREE-CANDIDATE(x) ~ALKW-TO(~:;i 
u X 
DEGREE-CANDIDATE(X) 
u=x 
__, SllOOK-HANDS-WITH( 11, z) 
LEfT(u) 
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In order to develop this into a full-fledged account many more details should 
be added, of course. What is important, however, is that this account gives 
us the required universal force for the second sentence of (6). 
E-type analysis 
It has been proposed (by [Sells, 1985; Neale, 1990; Gawron et al., 1991), 
among others) that the pronoun "he" in the second sentence of (39a) is an 
e-type pronoun [Evans, 1980; Parsons, 1978; Cooper, 1979]. We will follow 
here the presentation in [Neale, 1990]. The definition of e-type pronoun used 
by Neale is as follows: 
(43) 	 A pronoun P is E-type if is anaphoric on a quantifier Q that does not 
c-command P. [Neale, 1990] 
Thee-type hypothesis was motivated by examples like (44). Interpreting the 
pronoun "them" as bound by "Some sheep," as in ( 45), results in incorrect 
truth conditions. The problem with (45) is that it is true if Bill shaves just 
some of Harry's sheep. But intuitively, the truth of ( 44) requires Bill to shave 
all of Harry's sheep. 
(44) 	 Harry owns some sheep, and Bill shaves them. [Evans, 1980] 
(45) 	 [some x: sheep x](Harry owns x & Bill shaves x) 
Because ( 46) is a more plausible paraphrase of ( 44), Evans proposed that 
the unbound pronoun "them" in ( 44) should be interpreted via the plural 
description 'the donkeys John bought', as in ( 47). 
(46) 	 Harry owns some sheep, and Bill shaves the sheep Harry owns. 
(47) 	 [some x: sheep x](Harry owns x) & 
[the y: sheep y Harry owns y] (Bill shaves y) 
The crucial property of e-type pronouns is maximalil.y, defined by Neale as 
in (48): 
(48) 	 A quantifier '[Dx : Pxj' is maximal if and only if '[Dx : Px]( Gx )' entails 
'[\Ix: Px](G.r)' for arbitrary G. ([Neale, 1990], p. 180) 
Thee-type approach appears to make the correct predictions for a number of 
cases of unbound anaphora, including cases in which the pronoun is singular, 
such as (49), or cases where the quantifier to which the pronoun is anaphoric 
is maximal, such as (50). 
(49) 	 Just one man at my party drank rum. He was ill afterward. [Neale, 
1990] 
(50) 	 The women who came at the party were irritated by Bill; they com-
plained, in particular, about his chauvinism. [Neale, 
1990] 
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By claiming that the pronoun "he" in the second sentence of ( 6) is e-type, and 
assuming that the definite description operator 'the' is semantically equiva-
lent to a universal quantifier with uniqueness restrictions, thee-type analysis 
assigns to (6) truth conditions that can be expressed in ORT by tripartite 
DRS ( 51) (in which we use a the operator with the same truth conditions as 
Neale's 'the'): 
(6) 	 Each degree candidate; walked to the stage. He; took his diploma from 
the dean and returned to his, ,eat. 
' X y Z 
STAGE(y) 
DEAN(z) 
(51) DC(;REE-C' A !'l D!DATF.( :r) 
theIi D:GREE CANDIDATE(:r)I 
it WALKED-To(x, y) I 
SHOOJ(-!IANDSWITH(:r, z) 
LEAVE(x) 
First of all, let us note that (51) docs obey the licensing condition we have 
proposed, and therefore would not represent, if correct, a counterexample to 
the main thesis of this paper. However, ( 51) is not a correct interpretation 
of (6). It suffers, in fact, .;,From the same problem that originally led Heim 
to give up the E-type account of donkey ana.phorn, In order for (51) to be 
true under the standard semantics for the definite description operator 1the1 
- that Neale assumes- it must be the case that only one student walked to 
the stage, which is not, of course, what (6) means. 
Do we have, then, a conclusive argument against an e-type analysis for 
(6)? A possible way out, put forward by Neale in [Neale, 1990], is that 
the pronoun is e-typc, but that the definite description operator 'the' is not 
the appropriate operator. Neale assumes that pronouns may be translated 
as se.mantically numberless definite descriptions, represented using the new 
logical operator 'whe', defined as follows: 
(,52) '[whe x: F x](G :r)' is true ilf IF - GI= 0 and [FI~ 1 
Moreover, he assumes that two translations are available for pronouns, one 
using 'whe', the other using the singular or plural version of the definite 
description operator. If the 'whe' operator is used as the translation of "the" 
in (51), we obtain the right truth conditions for that sentence. On the other 
hand, we are now unable to explain why (1)-(4) are bad. 
(1) ??Every dog; came in. It lay down under the table. 
(2) *If every cat; purrs, it; is happy. 
(3) *If John owes every man, money then Sam pays him,. 
(4) "'John likes every dog; and Sam feeds it,. 
7 
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According to Neale, this is just as it should be; (1)-(4) should be ruled out 
pragmatically: 
... some people have argued that an adequate semantical theory 
must prevent pronouns from being interpreted as anaphoric on 
'every' phrases that do not c-command them. In my opinion, this 
is a mistake. ([Neale, 1990], p.232) 
Neale is not very explicit about the kind of pragmatic factors that could 
be involved, but it seems reasonable to assume that one of these pragmatic 
factors might very well be our knowledge about scripts-- our common knowl-
edge that certain events involve the execution of the steps of a routine by 
each element of a given set. It's hard to see which other pragmatic factors 
might be involved in explaining the constrast between (6) and (1). 
So, it doesn't seem to us that adopting Neale's position would lead to a 
significantly different account of that contrast. Nor is it clear to us that the 
system obtained by supplementing Neale's 'numberless descriptions' proposal 
with pragmatic factors would assign to (5)-(8) different truth conditions from 
the system we have used in this paper. It thus appears that such a system 
would still satisfy the Licensing Condition we propose. 
Conclusions, Additional Data 
We bave proposed that telescoping in (5)-(8) is possible because in all of these 
cases the sentence in which the telescoped pronoun occurs can be assigned 
a tripartite structure. We have seen how the implicit parts of the tripartite 
structure can be reconstructed, and proposed semantic constraints on the 
reconstruction process. 
Below are more cases of unbound anaphora to quantified antecedents 
which we did not discuss in this paper: 
(53) a. Every boy wants a dog,. *Every mother loves it;. 	 (Gawron) 
b. Every boy wants a dog;. Every mother will always love it;. 
(54) 	 Either there's no bathroom; in this house, or it;'s in a funny place. 
(Partee) 
(55) Every man except John gave his paychecki to his wife. John gave it; 
to his mistress. 
(Cooper's variation on Karttunen's theme, in [Chierchia, 1990]) 
(56) 	 Usually John hires a black limo,. However, today /sometimes it, is blue. 
[Beaver, 1991] 
(57) a. John has never ridden a camel,. 	*And it, stank. 
b. 	 John has never ridden a camel,. But Bill has. And it, stank. 
[Grinder and Postal, 1971] 
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